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the
gold standard
By Jacob Goldberg
death of an arch-terrorist
It is no wonder that the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 8 brought
a sigh of relief to many in Iraq, the Middle East, and the world at large.
A native of the town of Zarqa in north Jordan (hence his name), who had
started his criminal career two decades ago as a rapist, Zarqawi has become
in recent years the most dangerous, brutal, and highly efficient terrorist
leader in recent history.
To the US, Zarqawi became the number one symbol of the insurgency and
terrorism in Iraq. To millions of Muslims he was the symbol of national
resistance against the “imperialists” and an object of identification
and admiration.
Though he operated mainly in Iraq, no other person symbolized the new
phenomenon of International Jihad better than Zarqawi. At the time of
his death, Zarqawi was still trying to transform his organization from
one focused on the Iraqi insurgency into a global operation capable of
striking far beyond Iraq’s borders.
Iraq had become a training ground for international terrorism. There has
been a flow of terrorists into Iraq from other Arab, Islamic and even
from Western countries, seeking training under Zarqawi and his associates.
His recruiting efforts were varied: He set up operations in Syria, Iran
and Libya that funneled volunteers to fight in Iraq and others to become
suicide bombers there. But he also recruited hundreds who went to Iraq
just for training and sent them back to their home countries, where they
awaited orders to carry out strikes.
As the insurgency in Iraq became increasingly driven by local Iraqis,
Zarqawi sought to spread his reach globally, mobilizing his recruitment
networks to attack European targets, in effect challenging Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri as the leader of a global terrorist war.
However, so far the only attacks outside Iraq known to be directed by
Zarqawi were in Jordan, his native country. Those attacks include the
2002 murder of US diplomat Laurence Foley; a foiled plot in 2004 to attack
the American Embassy and Jordanian intelligence headquarters; and bombings
of three Amman hotels last November that killed 60 people.
Zarqawi's efficiency and innovation were demonstrated in another field
as well. Over the last two years, he turned the Web into a powerful tool
of global jihad, mobilizing computer-savvy allies who inspired extremists
in Iraq and beyond with lurid video clips of the bombings and beheadings
his group had carried out.
While other militants (the Chechens, Hamas), had built websites to spread
their message, Zarqawi was the first to take full advantage of the technology.
His Web propaganda embellished his reputation in the Iraqi insurgency.
But it also helped secure the Internet as a center of recruitment and
training, partly supplanting the role of old Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.
The critical question on everybody's mind now is, of course, the impact
of Zarqawi's death on future of terrorism in Iraq and the chance of stabilizing
the country.
There are those who argue that due to his central operational role, his
killing is even more important than Bin-Laden's death, which will mostly
have an influence on morale. Because Zarqawi was such a strong leader
and decision maker, they believe that al-Qaeda in Iraq would break into
splinter groups that would be weaker and easier to combat.
Others, however, claim that al-Qaeda had already gone through a process
of “atomization” and radicalization, whereby a large number
of terrorist groups might get their inspiration from central figures like
bin-Laden and Zarqawi, but they are basically independent units with their
own organizational and operational structure. Such a process makes it
all the more difficult to obtain good intelligence on these groups and
to scuttle their plans.
Moreover, they point to the fact that Zarqawi himself based the insurgency
in Iraq on multiple networks of terrorists with local and separate command
structure and operational conduct. Thus, there were independent terror
units in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Baquba, etc.
Such was also the pattern in other regions suffering from terrorism –
Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechniya and also in the Palestinian territories,
in which terrorism continued even after the liquidation of the “most
wanted” terrorist or ideological leader.
Iraq is not different from these other countries, though the situation
there is more complex due to the internal schisms and conflicts among
the Sunnites, Shiites and Kurds. Hence any hope for stability after Zarqawi
was premature. Indeed, within hours after his killing, a huge bombing
in Baghdad caused many casualties.
For his fellow terrorist followers, Zarqawi will be remembered by the
two slogans he had instilled in them: “Our credibility comes by
our leaders being killed,” and “Those of us who die, go to
heaven; those of 'you' who die, go to hell.” While his killing confirmed
the validity of the former, the latter would always serve as their “battle
cry.”
For feedback, contact editor@sdjewishjournal.com.
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