the gold standard
By Jacob Goldberg

inadequacies at the top

As the new government of Ehud Olmert was sworn-in, the usual criticisms abounded: the number of ministers, 27, created huge waste; ministers were appointed without the necessary credentials; the Prime Minister (PM) and his government will be hostage to the partisan interests of small parties, etc.

However, one new criticism reflected a factual novelty. This is the first time that the top four positions of PM, Defense, Foreign and Finance Ministers will be staffed by people with inadequate credentials, background and training. Olmert became PM without having ever served as Minister in any of the three top ministries. Defense Minister Amir Peretz has been a trade union leader all along, has never filled any government position (not even deputy-minister), and has never been involved in any defense-related roles, not to mention the irony of his post, considering the social campaign that he ran on.

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni (one of only two women in the cabinet) has had a meteoric rise in Israeli politics, but that was mainly due to her loyalty to Ariel Sharon, whom she followed into Kadima when he split from Likkud. Exactly the same can be said about Finance Minister Abraham Hirshzon, whose only government experience was as Minister of Tourism. But then, he has always sided with Sharon and Olmert in all party disputes.

These facts notwithstanding, the real novelty is in Ehud Olmert being the first PM of Israel to divulge to the public, prior to the elections, his strategy over the most critical subject in Israeli politics since 1967: the future status of the West Bank and its settlements. No other PM has ever stated explicitly that Israel had to withdraw from most of the West Bank and evacuate scores of thousands of settlers in order “to preserve the central tenet of Zionsim – a Jewish State with a clear Jewish majority.” Moreover, Israel had to do it even in the absence of a Palestinian partner signing a peace treaty. No PM has said it even after the elections, while Olmert not only stated it before the elections, but made it a central tenet of his campaign.

The architect of this policy was PM Ehud Barak, who called it “Unilateral Withdrawal.” Sharon adopted it in early 2004 and called it “Unilateral Disengagement.” Olmert coined the term “Convergence.” But these are merely semantics; the policy is essentially the same.

It is certain that no Likkud PM would have ever dared making such a public stand for fear of alienating his constituency. Moreover, no Labor PM candidate could have made such a statement, lest he was branded a “defeatist” and viewed as projecting weakness by major segments in the society.

This is where the Bing Bang of Israeli politics – the establishment of the new party Kadima – made such a difference. Bringing together prominent leaders of both Likkud and Labor changed the rules of the game. For the first time in almost four decades, a mainstream Israeli leader feels free to tell his people, in an election campaign, that holding on to the West Bank and keeping all the settlements constitute a major threat to the continuing existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and that it is in Israel's interest, not as a concession to its Arab neighbors, to abandon major portions of the area and evacuate settlements.

Olmert is, hence, bound by his clear campaign platform, which he himself elevated to the level of "ideology." This is his biggest challenge; it is also the yardstick by which he and his governments will be judged.

The difficulties along the road seem insurmountable, dwarfing those facing
Sharon's Gaza withdrawal: completing the security barrier within a year, evacuating 70,000 settlers (compared to 7,000 in Gaza), raising huge funds for settlers' compensations, facing an inevitable collision with the entire right-wing movement (Olmert's previous constituency), and igniting a national split that might undermine the delicate fabric of the Israeli society and some say may even lead to civil war.

Topping all these are two challenges. The first is the likelihood that Israel might have to implement the plan while Palestinian terrorism is back in full swing. The second is reflected in simple arithmetic: Olmert does not have sufficient political power in the Knesset to execute this policy. Kadima's 29 seats combined with Labor's 19, the Pensioners' 7 and Meretz's 5 make only 60. This forced him to include in the coalition a party like Shas, which does not see eye-to-eye with him on this critical issue.

As explained earlier, Sharon had faced an easier task. Moreover, he was a charismatic leader, a military hero and a veteran, seasoned politician, qualities that Olmert lacks.

This is Israel's 31st government. It reflects a life expectancy of 22 months per government (Italy is still not number one…). In view of the challenges facing it, very few people predict that it would survive its full four-year term.

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